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ABSTRACT 
This paper is a study of the various social and political sys-
tems which have been imposed on traditional agricultural economies 
in the past. Traditional agricultural is characterised by underemployment 
of the labor force except during harvest periods, and this has serious 
implications not only for the wage rate but also for labor's social and 
political freedom. Maximization of rent in an economy in which both land 
and labor are scarce brings strong pressures to bind labor to the farm through 
the crop year. Such restrictions have often taken the social and political 
form of feudalism. In a land surplus economy agricultural slavery may be 
practised in order to create a surplus for the propertied class. 
Modern agriculture differs from traditional agriculture 
in employing its labor force fully, or almost fully, throughout the year. 
This requires an increase in the productivity of harvest labor made 
possible by technological advance and an increase in the ratio of capital 
to labor in harvesting. In the end, agricultural labor becomes more 
prosperous, and the problems of the seasonal variation in employment 
are transferred from labor to capital. 
INTRODUCTIONS. 
This paper is a study of traditional (crop) agriculture, 
and its implications for the social and political affairs of those 
who lived and died in it. 
Traditional agriculture was generally characterized by a low 
output-labor ratio. But it was even more strongly characterized by the 
frenzy of activity in the harvest season required from every man, woman 
and child who could work and the equally striking relaxed manner of work 
2 3 and underemployment in the nonharvest seasons. ' Modernized agriculture 
in present-day industrial economies generally no longer has these 
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properties in Its demand for labor to any significant extent„ This 
aspect of traditional agricultural societies as against modern ones 
leads to the basic hypothesis of this papers in traditional agriculture, 
labor possesses a harvest usage and a nonharvest usage in the production 
of the harvested crop and it is generally fully employed only at the 
5,6 harvest time. ' Conversely, it is being assumed that, for most of the 
1. There were obviously exceptions to this statement, possibly 
in some types of slash and burn operations in early migratory settlements. 
See (2). 
2. Schultz (29) defines traditional agriculture as 2 
"Farming based wholly upon the kinds of factors of production that have 
been used by farmers for generations" (pp. 3-4). "For a long time 
nothing new has been learned from trial and error or from other sources. 
Conseqently, the state of the arts is constant..." (p. 3l). "As 
agriculture approaches the particular equilibrium of traditional 
agriculture, the marginal, productivity of investment in additional 
agricultural factors continues to decline... (until) there is no longer 
any incentive to save for additional investment in these factors." 
(pp. 31-2.) 
Our definition of traditional agriculture differs from that 
of Schultz in viewing traditional agriculture as characterized by this 
condition •—• leading to a production function of the type shown later in 
our equation (l)—- rather than as a stationary state for agriculture with 
a production function of any type whatever. 
3. Traditional agriculture need not imply a low per capita income 
under either our or Schultz5 3 definition (29), although it often did so. 
4. Agriculture may not be wholly able to overcome its seasr nality 
of demand for labor even in advanced industrial countries and may rely upon 
part-time or full-time workers migrating in from industry, from educational 
Institutions, or from other countries. For examples on Britain and United 
States, (see 4, p.114) and 3, p. 37). 
The variation of the work to be done over the crop-year in 
modernized agriculture is, however, generally handled by a relatively 
higher mechanization of harvesting work compared with that of non-harvesting 
worko 
5. Another period when it may be fully employed is the planting 
season. Our analysis is simplified but can be easily adapted for this 
possibility, 
6. For estimates of such seasonal underemployment in various 
countries at various times, see (4, ch„7)„ 
history of traditional agricultural societies, land was not the serious, 
inflexible barrier to output that is often implied„ The barrier was the 
availability of labor itself at harvest-time. 
It Is already obvious that the postulated agricultural pattern 
applies only to the farming of crops—-and within these, mainly to cereals — 
and not to pastoral agriculture. Economies of the latter type are, therefore, 
outside the scope of this paper. This still leaves a long span of human 
history in which agriculture was carried on under our assumptions. This 
was sometimes done under conditions where land and labor were both scarce, 
the case analyzed in section I below, It was sometimes done under 
conditions where only land was scarce, a topic of concern in modern 
development theory and analyzed in section II, But there do seem to 
have been some cases where only labor was scarce. This is analysed in 
section III, 
The theories that are offered in these sections are long-run 
economic theories. They abstract from the myriad patterns that different 
crops or different social and political systems can impose on the economic 
scene. The abstractions are heroic and our theories are an extreme 
simplification of a reality spanning different lands over centuries. 
The analysis may then appeal only to a few, of the type usually classified 
as good growth theorists. Nevertheless, they shed a great deal of light 
on the economic practices of societies with traditional agriculture. 
Section IV sets out some of the social and political implications-
of our economic analysis. Our motive In this section is to clarify and 
sharpen our understanding of the socio-political impact of the economic 
forces characteristic of traditional agriculture. Once these forces are 
recognised, It becomes possible to better understand and predict the 
political and social structures that will accompany such agriculture. 
Our jump from the economic to the social and political sphere is also a 
heroic one. It assumes, among other things, that the decisions, dominant 
in the long-run, made by labor and landowners concerning output and inputs 
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in traditional agriculture, were economic decisions — in the sense of 
being optimal for given objective functions and constraints — and that 
7. Schutz (29, ch.3) has cogently argued that traditional 
agriculture was highly efficient under its existing conditions so that 
even "competent farm managers...cannot show the farmers how to allocate 
better the existing factors of production" (29, p.52). Schultz based 
his conclusion on studies of Senapur, India, by Hopper ('1957) and of 
Penajachel, Guatemala, by Tax (1953). 
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if the market system was curtailed, it was done so because it was in 
the economic interest of the dominant groups in the society. The 
institutional structure of the society is thus a variable in our (long-run) 
analysis and not a datum inconsistent with economizing actions, 
I. AGRICULTURE WITH SCARCE LAND AND LABOR. 
Economists generally classify all the possible factors of 
production into land, labor and capital. Capital per laborer or per acre 
of land was generally small In traditional agriculture and did not change 
appreciably over centuries. The role of capital can, therefore, be 
ignored. This leaves only two factors of production, labor and land, as 
relevant to agricultural production,, Assume that each of these is 
homogeneous. 
Labor has basically two differing kinds of uses on the land. 
One of these is in activities other than harvesting. These activities 
take varied forms through the crop-year, such as ploughing, weeding, 
digging ditches and irrigating, etc. Such activities do not generally 
absorb all the labor force so that there is a pool of seasonally-unemployed 
labor which varies with the kinds of tasks required. Simplify by 
assuming that such non-harvest activities collectively employ the same 
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amount of labor throughout the crop-year excluding the harvest-season. 
Designate the quantity of labor thus employed as N*. The other usage of 
labor in agriculture is in harvesting. The harvest season in traditional 
agriculture has almost always employed the whole of the available labor g 
force, often with the physically-maximum number of work-hours per day. 
Designate the quantity of labor employed at harvest time as N". If the 
total available quantity of labor is designated as N and it is assumed 
that the labor force is fully employed at harvest-time, N"=N„ 
8. The analysis can be generalized to the case where each 
activity- - and the amount of labor employed by it - - is considered 
separately. However, our assumption is adequate for our purposes 
and highlights the results of the analysis, 
9. Exceptions to this statement may occur and are cited by the 
modern literature on the existence of surplus labor in some underdeveloped 
economies today. For example, see 7, 19 and 30. This case is analysed 
In section II below. 
10. The distinction between the number of laborers and the number 
of man-hours supplied is critical to the modern theory of development as, 
for example, in (30) and (35). However, our analysis is a long-run one 
and we have chosen to abstract from this distinction by assuming, say., 
a working day of a constant length: We do not believe that'allowing 
the working day to wary is either relevant to or affects the implications 
that we have chosen to derive in this paper.- Unemployment may, therefore, 
be interpreted as some laborers working less than the specified working 
day. 
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The general production function can then be written as 
Y = F (N*, N'\ L) (1) 
where Y is the total agricultural output which is harvested and L is the 
quantity of land. N®, N" and L are the quantities of the three distinct 
inputs In production though there are only two factors: labor and land. 
(l) may be assumed to posses the properties of neoclassical 
production functions or have fixed coefficients. The former case is more 
plausible In a long-run spanning centuries. It is also easier to work 
with. Therefore, assume that the first and second-order partial derivatives 
of (l) exist and are continuous. Also assume that the marginal product of 
each input in production is diminishing. Constant returns to scale are 
assumed"'""'" in order to ensure that Euler's theorem holds. No other use is 
made of this assumption since this property is otherwise academic with 
the land being taken as exogenously given. 
Assume also that the economic unit in charge of production of 
crops -— denoted in this paper as the landowner — maximizes profits. 
The information required for maximizing profits is, besides (l), the cost 
or price per unit of each of the inputs. A profit maximizing landowner 
would equate the marginal product of each input to its price in order to 
determine his demand for the inputs and his output. 
The prices of the inputs would obviously vary over space and 
time. Some information on these can be generated under alternative sets 
of assumptions. We examine some of these plausible alternatives in the 
next few pages and then comment on their applicability. 
Consider the price of land first. Land has already been assumed 
to be fixed in supply. Hence, the return to land, from a macroeconomic 
viewpoint, is a residual — a rent — after payment to other inputs. 
However, it is not a residual from the viewpoint of the individual farmer. 
Our focus is on the employment of labor rather than on the return to land 
and we proceed to. consider at great length the labor costs facing a farmer. 
11. That is9 AY = F(AN\ AN", XL). 
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The marginal product of labor is defined from (l) as 
3Y ^ 3Y 3N' t 3Y SN" (2) 
3N 3N'3N 3N" 3N 
3Y/3N > 0 in the neoclassical theory of a dual economy (17). 
3Y/3N = 0 i n the classical approach to the dual economy (21, 8), 
It seems unlikely that pure agricultural economies could have sustained 
a labor force over long periods of time with its marginal product equal 
to zero. It seems likely that the normal case for most societies was that 
3Y/3N > 0. We discuss this 
case in this section and postpone 
the treatment of the case 3Y/3N = 0 to the next section. Here we 
make an even stronger assumption that N"=N so that the total labor force 
was fully employed at least at harvest time. This seems perfectly 
consistent with the empirical evidence for most of the agricultural 
economies that we know of. That is, it is assumed, in addition to (l), 
that: 3Y/3N" > 0 and N=N" (3) 
(3) assures that 3Y/3N > 0 in (2).13 
Land has already been assumed to be fixed in supply so that 
the marginal product of labor must be diminishing in an economy with 
a growing labor supply. Hence, the output per laborer would decline as 
the labor force grows,Conversely, the output per acre of land would 
increase as the labor force grows. 
N' <_ N, with N as the labor force itself. Most agricultural 
economies had a surplus of labor at times other than the harvest so that 
N' < N seems to be the normal case for analysis. However, the possibility 
12. Boserup's study of essentially traditional agricultural soci-
eties strongly supports the conclusion "that in many cases the output from 
a given area of land responds far more generously to an additional input of 
labour than assumed by neo-Malthusian authors" (2, p.14). For example, 
increases in the frequency of cropping a given field have been an important 
means of increasing agricultural output from a given land area with an 
increasing population. Thus, cropping a plot once in a generation might give 
way to cropping every third year or so and finally to continuous crapping. 
13. A number of other restrictions on (l) seem reasonable. Assumptions 
made so far imply that 32Y/3W2 < 0. It Is further likely that (3F2/3n<gu") > o 
(N"/Y) (3F/3N") > (N'/Y) (3F/3N'). These restrictions are discussed later 
though only to the extent that they enter our analysis. 
14. For instance, see (12, pp. 778-79) for the declining output/labor 
ratio in the production of wheat and rye in 19th century Russia: 
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of Nf=N can emerge and is considered later in the analysis. It is, therefore, 
"being assumed at this stage that „,. r , Ns < N (4J 
Suppose that a labor market exists and is initially competitive 
or roughly competitive. The period for which labor contracts will be made 
is rarely specified or analyzed in modern economic theory but assumes a 
critical role in an analysis of traditional agriculture. There are two 
basic possibilities. These are considered below. 
One possibility is that the labor contracts •—• in the sense of 
the required notice of the termination of employment— are entered into 
for short periods, say for a week or a month, as in most present-day 
industrial economies. Separate contracts can then be negotiated for work 
in the nonharvest season and for work in the harvest or in one of the 
seasons only« Assuming profit-maximization by employers, labor will 
be paid its marginal product In the harvest season. But labor is never 
fully employed in the nonharvest season. If laborers were willing to 
work for any wage, no matter how low, the competitive labor market would 
drive the wage rate in the nonharvest season to zero (or some negligible 
amount). It is, however, unlikely that laborers would work for a zero 
wage. Their preferences between work and leisure would specify a supply 
function for labor for nonharvest work. Such a function may, and is 
likely to, show a zero supply of labor at a zero wage rate and even at 
some low wage rates. Hence the wage rate for nonharvest labor will have 
to be positive. The total wage per laborer for the crop-year will be 
the sum of the wage for harvest work and of the wage for nonharvest work. 
The other possibility is that wages will be negotiated for the 
crop-year and not separately for harvest and nonharvest seasons or their 
subperiods. Such a crop-year or annual wage could be paid out in 
monthly — or some other subperiod -— instalments of equal or unequal 
length* A variety of practices is possible here, as In the present-day academic 
/ _ 
professions,, It iss however, likely that the monthly installment will be 
higher In harvest time than in nonharvest times to reflect the relatively 
greater amount of work required in the harvest season. 
Under crop-year contracts with a positive marginal product of 
harvest labor and with N° <N, the competitive labor market ensures that no 
wage needs In fact be paid for the work done during the nonharvest 
15 
season, Nonharvest labor would then be employed until its marginal 
product, 9Y/3N', becomes zero. That is, 
3Y = 0 (5) 
3W 
Since 3Y/3N'is likely to be a function of U',K[" and L, (5) can be solved 
for N", the quantity of labor employed in the nonharvest season, for a given 
labor force and a given supply of land. 
The employment of labor would be larger in the nonharvest season 
if its marginal product were zero than if it were positive. Conversely, 
the marginal product of land would be higher if more rather than less 
nonharvest labor is employed. Employers of labor then have a strong 
economic interest in negotiating annual or crop-year contracts rather than 
monthly onesS their rents are higher for the former than for the latter. 
However, laborers have an interest in negotiating monthly contracts. 
The economic interest of groups over the long run is supported 
by the social and political pressures that can be applied. Employers of 
labor In general can bring such pressures to a greater degree than laborers 
looking for work. The capacity of the latter to resist such pressures 
depends upon their organization, usually lacking in most agricultural 
societies, upon the existence of independent means of livelihood and upon 
various other factors. In most societies It is unlikely that the pressures 
could be resisted in the long run, so that most agricultural societies 
should show a pattern of crop-year rather than monthly contracts. This is 
all the more likely in unsettled societies in which the law cannot guarantee 
personal security or the security of one's property, so that protection has 
to be sought through association or subservience to others, usually among 
the landowners. However, other societies in which each person is economically 
15, Provided, of course, that the marginal product of labor in the 
harvest season ensures a wage rate at which laborers are willing to work.0 
This marginal product can be quite high, as will be seen later in this 
section, while the minimum wage required by labor to induce it to work can 
be extremely low and at a bare subsistence level. 
strong and sufficiently secure could function under monthly contracts. 
This variety is likely to be a minority, with a tendency towards a further 
decline in number. We analyse further the most likely case of crop-year 
contracts with nonharvest labor employed up to the point where its marginal 
product becomes zero. 
Assuming (5), N9/N would be constant if the production function 
is homothetic in N® and N„ One special form of such a function is, for 
Illustration 5 
Y = A01 F (AN' , AN", L) -1 <a< 0 (6) 
In this case, the isoquants between l\l° and N" are radially-parallel to 
one another, as shown by the curves Q^, Q 2 and GL in figure (la). The 
efficient expansion path with 3Y/3N' = 0 is shown by the ray OA through 
the origin. 
There does not seem any analytical necessity to assume that 
the production function has the form (6) nor does it seem likely that 
such a production function would have held for long periods for land 
of different qualities. The expansion path may then have any shape, 
passing, however, through each isoquant at the point at which it becomes 
perfectly vertical - i.e., at the point at which 3Y/3N' = 0. An a .priori 
judgment cannot be made on the likelihood of the case that actually holds. 
However, the size of the harvest — and the density of the crop — determines 
employment in the harvest season, with the likelihood of a roughly constant 
crop/employment ratio. It is likely to be increasingly difficult to eke 
ever-increasing harvests out of a fixed quantity of land, so that the marginal 
productivity of N® must not only be diminishing but Increasingly so as N® 
increases. Hence N'/N is likely to increase as l\l increases, a case shown 
in figure (lb). That is, a greater proportion of the labor force becomes 
increasingly employed throughout the year. This is, however, not a blessing 
for labor so employed since there is no increase in total renumeration for 
such work. In fact, it represents a worsening of the overall standard of 
living (including leisure) for labor. 
Another possibility that could exist Is one where the expansion 
path is as shown in figure (ic). This case is the one consistent with the 
increasing marginal productivity of N® on a given amount of land, a 
possibility that may exist in newly opened and underpopulated lands. 
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Figure (ic) shows, therefore, a rather rare case compared with that shown 
by figure (lb) and we concentrate our attention on the latter case. 
The argument for a zero marginal product of nonharvest labor 
can be better understood in the context of a special production function 
especially suited to land. Such a production function is 
Y = F [ G(N', L), N"] (7)16 
(7) can be interpreted ass nonharvest labor and land combine to produce 
a crop standing in the fields, represented by the function G(N®,L)„ The 
crop in the fields (G) and harvest labor (N") are, in turn, combined to 
produce the harvested output Y» The amount of harvest labor does not 
influence the rate of substitution between N® and L in producing the field-
crop. The crop-year marginal productivity of labor for (7) is, 
BY -3 F 3G 3TT_ + 3£ 3IT (8) 
3N 3G 3N' 3N 3N" 3N 
It was argued earlier that 3_Y That is, 
3Y = _3F 3G = 0 (9) 
3N' 3G 3N' 
The bottleneck in agriculture is harvest-labor, with the labor force 
employed to its full capacity. Given values of N° and L imply not only 
a certain field-crop but, with given L, also a certain density of crops 
per acre. The total crop that can be harvested is set by the size of the 
harvest labor-force so that any increase in the field-crop with a given 
N", will not increase the harvested-crop„ That is, 3F/3G = 0 in (9). 
It is unlikely that 3G/3N' = 0. We may, therefore, assume thats 
3F - 0 and 3G > 0 (10) 
3G 3N' 
That is, the marginal productivity of nonharvest labor is not zero in the 
sense that any increase in it cannot increase the crop planted or maturing 
in the fields. It is zero only in the sense that any increase in N® cannot 
increase the crop harvested. This seems to be plausible for most 
agricultural economies; only that crop is planted which can be harvested 
by the available labor force. 
In terms of the argument for a diminishing marginal product of 
labor, it seems likely that there would be roughly constant returns to scale 
16. Note that our concern In specifying this function is with the 
long-run. From a short-run viewpoint, N" in any given year depends upon the 
crop ready to be harvested. This would depend upon the weather and upon N® and 
L. N" is then a function of N° and L. We have abstracted from the variations 
in Weather conditions in different years so that our analysis generates the 
long-run path of N" but not its actual short-run values. 
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for proportionate increases in the field-crop and in harvest labor. However, 
as the nonharvest labor force increases on a given land, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to increase the field crops planting has to be done more carefully, 
weeding more often, etc.. That is, there are significantly diminishing 
returns to nonharvest labor In terms of the field-crop. These arguments, 
suggest that (7) has the properties: 
AY = F C AG(N'9 L)5 AN" ] (11) 
G(AN'9 AL) < AG(N\ L) (12) 
These implications invite comparison with the controversy on 
the existence or non-existence of surplus labor in the economy. The model 
shows a positive marginal productivity of labor on an annual basis and 
hence is in accord with the neoclassical theory of the dual economy as set 
out by Jorgensen (17). Labor could not thus be withdrawn from agriculture 
in such conditions without diminishing the total agricultural output. 
Further, the distinction drawn by Sen (30) between the number of labourers 
and the number of man-hours, with variation in the number of man-hours worked 
per laborer, does not arise here. Labor is fully employed at harvest time, 
with each laborer putting in the longest-possible working day, since the 
wage, not only during harvest time but throughout the year, is dependent 
on the work put in at harvest time. 
The model presented here also uses the neoclassical assumption 
that the labor force in agriculture will be paid its marginal product. From 
the long-run point of view, a fair degree of competition would ensure 
that the annual wage rate tends to equal the crop-year marginal product of 
labor. The perspective here is one of decades and even centuries. 
The requirement of work whose marginal productivity and hence 
wage is zero must lead to a considerable social pressure to avoid such work 
through land ownership and employment of others. The high and increasing 
marginal productivity of land as labor Increases makes it increasingly 
easier to live off the proceeds of land and be a landlord only, without 
being a cultivator, if there was sufficient capital to purchase enough land. 
But the social pressure to own land must be intense even for those with 
a little capital since ownership of land provides for continuous year-round 
employment and freedom from social or political bondage implied in such 
a system. 
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Further, since N'< N, there exists a considerable degree of 
-seasonal unemployment in such an economy„ The permanence of such 
unemployment over time without a wage Implies that social customs, which 
allow for the sharing of such work, arise. Such unemployment would 
then take the form of underemployment or disguised unemployment rather than 
of outright unemployment. 
The marginal productivity of labor at nonharvest times is zero. 
Some of this labor could be withdrawn from agriculture without decreasing 
agricultural output. Such a phenomenon could occur and has occurred 
extensively in history under a putting-out system or a Gandhian-type 
village•development. The putting-out system was a form of domestic 
industry employing very little capital per worker, organized and co-ordinated 
by travelling merchants bringing raw materials to the villagers and 
carrying away the finished product. Payment was usually by piece. 
This system existed throughout much of Europe during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centui ies, if not much earlier. 
From the perspective of a development plan, the labor unemployed 
at nonharvest times could be used in community improvement schemes or 
any other work without detriment to agricultural output. The disadvantage 
of employing such labor is that it is seasonal, located In the countryside 
and primarily rural in skills and outlook. Its seasonality may rule out 
its use on capital-intensive' projects in a country which is very short 
on capital. This implies the need for a sector or industries which 
do not require any significant amount of land or capital per laborer. 
Traditional village industries such as the spinning and.weaving of 
cloth, as of carpets in many parts of Asia today, local construction, 
etc., are examples of such industries. 
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II. AGRICULTURE WITH SCARCE LAND AND SURPLUS LABOR. 
As the labor force grows relative to a given supply of land, 
it may reach a point where its marginal product becomes zero. This implies, 
in terms of (8), that 
3Y = 9F 8G 3N1 + 3F 3N" = 0 (13) 
3N 3G 3N' 3N 3N" 3N 
While it is a mathematical possibility that this condition is met by either 
3F/3N' or 3F/3N" being positive, with the other being negative, this does 
not seem to be a realistic possibility. The most likely case is one where 
an increase in nonharvest labor can not increase the field-crop, i.e., 3G = 0, 
3T\T' 
so that, eventually, with a given field-crop, additions to the harvest 
labor force cannot increase the crop harvested, i.e., 3F/3N" = 0. 3Y/3N = 0 
implies that agricultural output is at its maximum for the given supply 
of land. Such a possibility exists and was posited by the classical 
economists such as Ricardo. It is basic to the models of (21) and (8). 
Its critical empirical test is the implication from 3F/3W" - 0 that the labor 
force employed in the harvest season has reached its maximum so that 
unemployment exists even in the harvest season and grows as the labor 
force grows. 
Most past agricultural societies have left graphic accounts of 
the frenzied activity in the harvest season with every man, woman and child 
fully occupied with some activity at harvesting times and working for the 
physically longest possible working day. Such societies did not satisfy 
T T 17 the requirement that 3F/3N = 0, However, some writers have maintained 
that this possibility has occurred in some societies in recent decades, 
as, for example in India. If this has occurred with normal — and not 
with unexpectedly poor — harvests, it seems to have been a genuinely rare 
case in human history for several possible reasons, the most important of 
these being that labor cannot subsist, without declining, below certain 
minimum living standardss 
For example, see (19) for summaries of some of the studies 
reaching this conclusion. 
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The conditions suggested above for the zero marginal product 
of labor are that: 
3G = 0 and 3F = 0 (lM 
3N' 3N" 
Note that neither of these conditions requires that 3F/3G = Osthe condition 
suggested earlier as the reason for the existence of unemployment in the 
nonharvest season. In fact, it is likely that an increase in the field 
crop, if it can occur, can be harvested with an increased harvest-labor 
force, so that 3F/3G>0 when (14) holds. The conditions for the existence 
of seasonal and full-year unemployment are, therefore, quite different, 
without either one implying the other. The literature on development has, 
unfortunately, often used one to imply the other, as in taking the existence 
of large scale nonharvest season unemployment to show the zero marginal 
product of labor and year-round unemployment (19). In fact, if the long-run 
expansion path was as shown by the curve OA in figure (lb), overpopulated 
economies satisfying (14) would show relatively little, if any, seasonal 
unemployment: they are likely to have attained the 45° path before the 
level of population was large enough to satisfy (14). This implies 
another test of the Classical surplus-labor assumption: the level of 
employment (or underemployment) would be fairly well constant over the 
harvest and the nonharvest seasons as compared with the likely form of the 
neoclassical case where the level of employment is much less in the 
nonharvest season as compared with that in the harvest season. 
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III, AGRICULTURE WITH SCARCE LABOR AND SURPLUS LAND. 
Another case that is both realistic and analytically interesting 
is one where land is unlimited In supply relative to labor. Such a 
condition exists where unsettled land Is almost as fertile as the existing 
land and can be claimed by anyone willing to clear it and farm it. Such 
a condition must have existed for thousands of years in human history, 
It existed as recently as the nineteenth century in much of the Americas 
and may be met even now in parts of Brazile 
Land which is relatively unlimited in supply cannot command a 
positive price so that its optimal usage requires that its marginal 
productivity must be zero. This implies, in the context of the discussion 
in section I, that only harvest labor can have a positive marginal product 
18 in any optimal usage of the factors of production. Therefore, the total 
19 output must be payable only to labor. 
However, while nonharvest work has a marginal productivity of 
zero and, therefore, a wage of zero, this work is essential to production. 
Crop-year contracts or some other commitment to stay on the farm are still 
required. But another additional complication has been introduced: it 
does not pay to be a landowner since ownership of land has a zero economic 
return. Therefore, employment of labor which is paid its marginal product 
Is hardly worthwhile even under crop-year contracts. Land ownership and 
employment of others is only economically profitable if the others work 
without a wage, as on the family farms or In slavery. In both these cases, 
labor need not be paid its marginal product, In neither case can more 
be spent per laborer than the marginal product of labor since labor is the 
20 only scarce factor of production. The family is a social unit in which 
18. This section assumes the case suggested in section I as being 
dominant — that is, N" < N leads to a zero rate of return to nonharvest 
labor and a zero marginal product for it. 
19. Note that our analysis has not explicitly allowed for capital 
as an Input. If some capital is used, part of the output will go as a 
return to capital. 
20. Constant returns to scale In production were assumed earlier. 
Therefore, with surplus land and surplus nonharvest labor, Euler's theorum 
states that, Y = (SY/8N")N" 
so that the average and the marginal products of harvest labor are equal. 
allocation is not according to an economic criterion and the total output 
or earnings of its members is distributed among the members, Slavery, how-
ever, is an institution under which the slave- and land-owner captures 
for his own use that part of the marginal product of labor which he does 
not spend on slave-labor. Call this the !slave-surplus-product. 
If land on which slave labor can be used is unlimited, as Is 
total land, the slave-surplus-product attaches solely to the ownership 
of slaves and their capital value would reflect it. Land would still 
possess a zero price. If, however, land is relatively unlimited but 
the land on which slave labor is permitted or is profitable to use is 
relatively limited, such slave-using land would capture some of the slave-
surplus-product and would command a positive value. Conversely, the 
abolition of slavery would eliminate the economic basis for the value of 
such land. 
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IV. SOME SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIES,. 
This section departs from economic theory to speculate on the 
institutional practices which may be said to flow reasonably out of the 
implications derived above of our economic models. Two basic assumptions 
relate these economic implications to their social and political implications 
derived in this section. One of these assumptions is that a social and 
political institution cannot exist for long in a historical context if it 
is not in the economic interest of the dominant political group in the 
society, The other assumption is that if certain social and political 
practices are substantially to the economic benefit of such a group and 
that knowledge and moral acceptance of such practices exists, then such 
practices are likely to come into being. These seem to be reasonable 
over the long time span for which traditional agricultural patterns have 
dominated the life of settled communities in human history. 
Economists are constantly aware of the disturbances that 
may upset the equilibrium values of the variables in their theories. 
Powerful disturbances that may upset the social and political implications 
of the preceding equilibrium analysis can come from the basic nature of 
man and his environment, defining these terms in their broadest sense. 
An ideological revolution such as the emergence of a religion or a 
communist revolution is one example of such a disturbance. Another example 
is foreign conquest and rule, imposing its own patterns upon the economy 
and polity. Such disturbances can clearly occur frequently and leave 
their impact for centuries. Our subsequent comments in this section 
obviously abstract from such disturbances and their impact. 
IV.1 This subsection considers only the case where both land and 
labor are scarce, i.e., both have a positive marginal product. The major 
implication derived earlier and of interest here is that it is to the 
interest of landowners that labor contracts should be for the crop-year, 
with a crop-year wage equal to the marginal product of labor in the harvest 
season. There is no payment for nonharvest work and there would be no 
incentive to do such work in a system of monthly contracts. It is, however, 
in the interest of laborers to enter into monthly contracts so that they 
can earn a positive wage even for nonharvest work. A variety of practices 
are, therefore, likely to exist. The most dominant of these would be 
the one in the interest of landowners from whom the politically powerful 
classes generally come and would require crop-year contracts. 
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The tying-down of labor to a farm for the crop-year requires 
restrictions both on the mobility of labor and on its capability in bargaining 
for wages. Such restrictions can be met within the family unit, a co-opera-
tive, a kibbutz or some other form of free association of adults. But such 
free associations of adults have been relatively rare compared with the non-
21 22 free associations. The medieval feudal system in Europe and Japan in its 
complex variations is a prime example of the social and political practices 
characteristic of such non-free associations. 
Europe and Japan differ in many important respects, especially 
in terms of geographical location and cultures. They did not share a 
heritage of slavery or feudalistic traditions. Yet they both evolved 
feudalistic practices. The explanation for such evolution may be in the 
common economic patterns that they shared. Both have temperate climates 
so that generally only single-cropping per year was possible. Both practiced 
farming in a manner that confrormed to the model set out in section I and, 
therefore, required the tying down of labor to the farm for almost ten 
months or more of the year. 
This tying down of labor, or crop-year labor contracts as we 
have designated it earlier, cannot take a purely economic form where labor 
has an interest against such practices and where labor does not possess 
any capital which can be attached'— or taken as a lien— "or failure to 
abide by the contract. It must, therefore, take a social and political 
form. The family system achieves this purpose by tying down a wife and young 
children, though not necessarily mature children unless they are tempted 
by the possibility of the inheritance of the land. Labor may also be 
tied down by grants of small parcels of land, by giving minor grazing rights 
to laborers on the landlord's land, by allowing squatters to put up shanties, 
etc., always in exchange for services on the landlord's land. But such 
incentives are likely to be reinforced by customs or even laws against labor 
reneging on such services and moving away. This picture is very much that 
of feudalism. 
21. A family composed of a man, his wife and their young children 
is not really a free association. An extended family is a free association which 
can be fairly common. 
22. We are concerned with economic and not with political feudalism. 
The former is basically characterised by "tenures more or less servile in 
character". Economic feudalism may exist independently or jointly with its 
political counterpart. Thus, in France "political feudalism, then,- was dead 
(long before 1789); economic feudalism was living and vigorous", (15, p. xviii) 
as it had been for centuries. Serfdom had disappeared, the peasant was 
personally free but he still owed various forms of compulsory services to 
the seigneur and was restricted in his movement or freedom to farm his own 
land. 
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Marc Bloch described the characteristics of a feudal society 
as one with "a subject peasantry; widespread use of the service. tenement 
(i.e., the fief) instead of salary, supremacy of a class of specialised warriors; 
ties of obedience and protection which bind man to man; fragmentation of 
authority; and, in the midst of all this, survival of other forms of association, 
family and State" (16, p, xlx). Lenin, looking at feudalism from the economic 
viepoint, emphasized the economic element In his definition of a "corvee economy" 
as 
Firstly, the predominance of natural economy 
Secondly, such an economy required that the direct producer be allotted 
the means of production in general, and land in particular; moreover, that he be 
tied to the land, since otherwise the landlord was not assured of hands.... 
Thirdly, a condition for such a system of economy was the personal 
dependence of the peasant on the landlord.... There was required "extra-
economic" coercion as Marx calls it ... Fourthly, and finally, a 
condition and consequence of the system of economy described was the 
extremely low and stagnant condition of technique, for the conduct of 
husbandry was in the hands of small peasants, crushed by poverty and degraded 
by personal dependence and by ignorance. (20, pp. 191-2) 
Feudalistic societies created the dependence of the peasant upon 
the landowner In a variety of ways. This dependence might be that of the landless 
serfs or villeins, forbidden to leave the farm on pain of personal punishment. 
It might be that of free yeomanry owning their own land but owing services to 
the landowner, often during the harvesting season. It might, in between, be 
the dependence of squatters using the landlord's land marginally in exchange for 
a few services. 
The fundamental characteristic in these, as in other descriptions of 
•-feudalism, is that of a "subject peasantry" with a "limited and conditional 
service". Such a characteristic is, as argued earlier, the major implication 
of our model for societies in which land was relatively limited. 
In Europe economic feudalism was less severe whenever the bargaining 
power of laborers increased through a decline in population, or through the 
existence of new areas being settled or because of proximity to a town. If one 
looks at Latin America, where economic feudalism has existed without its political 
counterpart, several important points should be made. Labor was not necessarily 
immobile initially but was rendered immobile in the interest of landowers. 
Political forces were not required to bring economic feudalism into being; in fact, 
the latter came Into being and existed in spite of the opposition of the national 
authority. Further, the lack, or existence, of an outside market for the 
estate's produce was not generally relevant for the creation or existence of 
peonage. The economic forces implied by our earlier analysis can thus have an 
impact upon the economic, social and political institutions even in the absence 
of significant labor mobility and of significant markets for produce. These 
factors have been claimed, we believe erroneously, by some writers to Imply 
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23 institutional rather than economic behaviour and thus the inapplicability 
of our economic analysis'— or of economizing actions— to studies of 
feudalism and of other non-market economies (e.g., see 28, pp= 239-42). 
Compare the feudalistic societies pictured above with others 
existing earlier in time and with relatively unlimited land. Greece in 
the pre-Christian era is a prime example of such societies. The wealth 
of documentation on Greece attests to the presence of slaves in farming 
as well as to the absence of a subject peasantry in it. Egypt, before 
the rise of Athenian Greece, attests to the same phenomenom. The American 
South in the nineteenth century is another example, and a modern-day one 
at that, of the applicability of our models to the existence of feudalism: 
the American South knew and practiced slavery but not feudalism. Latin 
America practiced both slavery and feudalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, with slavery being practiced in areas which had a smaller 
native population. For another comparison, predominantly pastoral eocnomies 
as in Africa to the present day never seem to have had feudalistic 
relations: pastoral agriculture has a production function which does not 
create seasonal unemployment of the kind derived for crop-farming in this 
paper and can allow for labor force mobility„ 
One society which had scarce land as well as a traditional 
pattern of crop-farming and which, nevertheless, escaped a virulent form 
of feudalism is India. One possible explanation for such contrasting 
development of social and political institutions' between the old settled 
lands of Europe and Japan and those of India seems to lie in the differences 
in climate which permit a double-cropping pattern over much of India. 
Double-cropping in traditional farming allows for seasonal unemployment 
but such unemployment is much less significant than in a single-cropping 
economy: there are two harvest seasons In the former and the nonharvest work for 
23. Thus Pirenne contends that in medieval Europe, 
The whole idea of profit, and indeed the possibility of profit, 
was Incompatible with the position occupied by the great 
medieval landowner. Unable to produce for sale owing to the want 
of a market... and as he was forced to consume his own produce, 
he was content to limit it to his needs. (27, p. 63). 
We disagree. The possibility of a monetary profit was undoubtedly 
limited but not so the possibility of achieving higher levels of a good life 
or supporting a bigger retenue of armed servants to enhance the lord's power 
and prestige. Pirenne's views contrast with those of Pearse (25) and 
Miskimin (22) with his emphasis on continuing economic adjustments in labor 
services between the landlord and peasant throughout the medieval period 
and down to the eighteenth century. 
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each has to be compressed into the few remaining months, with the possibility 
that there may at most be only a few weeks, perhaps spread out over the 
non-harvest seasons, in which labor is not fully employed. There does not, 
therefore, exist the same intensity in the economic interest of landowners 
to tie labor down to the farm by feudalistic forms. Indian agriculture 
remained, therefore, remarkably free of feudalistic institutions. It could 
not, of course, completely escape some mild forms of feudalism, mainly in 
24 the form of customary services, some of them embedded in the caste system 
25 and some in the Zamindari system. 
Another society that had traditional agriculture with scarce 
26 land but evaded feudalism was China. Southern China, like India, also had 
24. Land in many parts of pre-British India 
was regarded as being part of an aggregate, rather than 
belonging to a single person... (thus) different people—notably 
the cultivator, the Brahman, and the King—all had rights in 
the land which it would be impossible for anyone else to alienate. 
These rights were inherent in the functions that each performed.... 
(Thus) Brahmans could not sell lands...to anyone except another 
Brahman (6, pp. 45-46). 
25. Thus in the Mughal period, 
The zamindars, other than the peasant proprietors, generally 
gave their lands in hereditary lease to their tenants, who 
enjoyed security of tenure in terms of the patta granted to 
them, on condition that they paid their land revenue regularly. 
Even in. cases of nonpayment the tenant was not usually deprived 
of his landholdlng rights, but the arrears were realized by 
other means. Considering the fact that there was not much 
pressure on land, the rights of the landholdings tenants were 
generally respected. At the same time, in view of the shortage 
of cultivators, the xamindars enjoyed the right to restrain 
the tenants from leaving their lands and to compel them to 
cultivate all arable land held by them. (14, p. 28.) Also 
see (6, p.47). 
26.. However, the early stages of Chinese society prior to its first 
unification under the Ch'in during the third century B.C. have often been 
described as feudal In character. 
There-had been a constant struggle between the government and a semi-
feudal aristocracy which attempted to build up large estates prior to the 
southern Sung dynasty (1127 —1179). By the twelfth century, this struggle 
had been lost by the feudal aristocrats who were gradually becoming landowners, 
claiming only a share of the harvest from their tenants. (26, ch.5.) 
China "possesses no landed aristocracy.„.manorial estates worked by corvees, 
if they ever existed, have lest few traces....landlord and tenant are parties 
to a business contract, not members of different classes based on privilege 
and subordination. " (33, p. 63.) 
The tenant in China, even if only a tenant at the landowner's will, 
pays rent, normally a percentage of the crop and rarely owes any labor-services. 
The rents may reach as high as 50 to 6£P/o of the crop. (ibid„, pp. 65-66.) 
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a double-cropping system over mo~t of its densely populated regions and 
its economic and political dominance over northern China, which had a 
single-cropping pattern, may have contributed to the absence of feudalism 
in the latter. While China, like India, escaped any virulent form of 
feudalism, it did evolve some tying of labor to the village and the landlords. 
And now a final comment on the social and political structure 
of lands with traditional agriculture, scarce land and single-cropping, 
•ur model does not specify a feudalistic structure for all such societies 
but dominantly so. Communities with free farmers owning their own lands 
could exist, as they undoubtedly did in a few places in feudalistic 
Europe and Japan. Conversely, peasant farming would be relatively more 
common where the economic Interests of landlords towards forms of feudalism 
were weaker, as they were historically in India and China, 
IV. 2 Section II considered the case where land, is scarce but there 
is a surplus of both harvest and nonharvest labor. The marginal product 
of labor is, therefore, zero throughout the year. This case does not 
seem realistic to us for purely agricultural economies. As the marginal 
productivity falls and with it the wage rate and average productivity, the 
latter must eventually fall below the physical subsistence level. This is 
likely to happen even before the marginal productivity of labor declines 
to zero. As living standards fall, the Malthusian spectres of war, 
starvation and disease must check population growth. The long-run relationship 
between population and land is, therefore, endogenous and is likely to 
prevent a zero marginal productivity of labor In pure agricultural societies. 
The phenomenom could, however, occur In dual economies, with the industrial 
sector supporting the agricultural population above subsistence even with 
its zero marginal productivity in agriculture. But societies which have a 
developed industrial sector do not seem to have experienced such a phenomenom. 
The possibility of its existence does seem to occur in pure 
agricultural economies whose population has grown to a point where the 
Malthusian restraints would occur but are prevented from occurring by foreign 
assistance or rigorous rationing. These are temporary expedients in a historical 
context. These conditions may have applied in India and China, as in some 
27 other countries, in recent decades. The occurrence of the seed-based 
27. See (19) for evaluation of several studies on the subject. 
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Green Revolution in such countries points to their speedy elimination 
anyway. The increasing Industrialisation of these countries is another 
reason, though a slower one, for such elimination. 
IVo 3 Section III considered the case where land is relatively unlimited 
in supply. Such a case was shown to be a condition favorable to the long-run 
28 
existence of slavery. A few examples of this case are given below, 
though our limited knowledge of societies with slave-using agriculture 
makes us add a note of caution here. 
There seems to be a strong religious and/or moral rule against 
large-scale enslavement of people of one's own race. Slavery has thus 
existed over long periods only where there was more than one race and, of 
course, only If one of the races was militarily weaker than the other. 
Further, people cannot be enslaved long, and at a profit, when others of 
the same race are free and in close geographical proximity: escapes would 
be common and It would be difficult or impossible to recapture the escaped 
slave. The use of African slaves in the Americas in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, rather than of European or Indian ones-— 
though the latter was widely attempted— is an example of these points. 
European societies before the birth of Christ clearly practised 
slavery on the farm. Greece did so and so did Rome in this period. Land 
in such societies was fairly plentiful, with large unsettled tracts. As 
population and settlements grew, the relative scarcity of land came into 
being. Slavery seems to have vanished from European agriculture long before 
the tenth century, although it was religiously, socially and morally 
permissible. It had given way to feudalism, a characteristic designated 
by us as one of societies with scarcity of land. 
The revival of slavery in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries in the Americas is an illustrative episode for our purposes. 
The slave-owners came from a European society which accepted the institution 
of slavery but never used it on the farm. The remarkable revival 
slavery in agricultural work after it had disappeared from Europe for a 
28. Slaves differ from serfs and vassals in a feudalistic society 
in that the farmer do not possess any cultivation rights, be they rights 
of ownership of land or shared usage of land, while the latter do possess 
such rights, encumbered, though, by obligations of labor and other services. 
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thousand years could be explained by the almost unlimited supply of land 
29 relative to free labor in the Americas. In the American context, the 
institutio n of slavery spread and strengthoped in the southern United States 
30 
precisely when the Mid-West and West were being opened up. 
V. THE MODERNISATION OF AGRICULTURE. 
V.l. 1 The models outlined so far and their implications are not 
applicable to modernised agriculture. Modernised agriculture differs 
from traditional agriculture outlined so far in terms of the techniques 
employed, whether such techniques are the result of the greater 
availability of capital or of technical change or of both. The impact of 
these two factors can take a variety of forms. Our concern here is 
very much narrower than the full variety of ways in which technical change 
and the greater availability of capital can change the pattern of agriculture. 
We focus only on the most fundamental change between traditional and 
modernised agriculture: the disappearance of seasonally—unemployed labor 
31 from agriculture. 
29. " "'Free' land disappears already before the agricultural 
stage is reached. Tribes of food collectors and hunters consider that they 
have exclusive rights to collect food and to hunt in a particular area,,.". 
(2, p. 79.) The existence of 'free* land in the Americas from the 
seventeeth to the ninteenth centuries was through acts of continuing legal 
or illegal expropriations from the Indians who had originally claimed the 
land. Land was thus free to the Europeans only. It was not free to the 
Indians, and, in fact, the Indians did not practice slavery to any large 
extent before the European conquest. 
30. For an excellent empirical study of the dependence of the price 
of slaves on their productivity, on their cost of maintenance, on the prices 
of output and on their supply, see (s)„ 
Extensive, rather than intensive, agriculture was generally 
common to all North American colonial agriculture until the twentieth 
century. In so far as slave labor is cheaper, its efficient usage would 
require a larger usage of slave labor rather than of free labor per acre. 
Therefore, areas in the Americas in which slavery was permitted tended to 
develop cotton and sugar cane plantations, compared with areas using semi-free 
or free labor and growing cereals. Slave labor, at the same time,seemed 
inefficient compared with free labor since its marginal productivity would 
be lower. 
31. See footnote 4 above. 
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The most critical bottleneck in traditional agriculture is the 
fact that there is a close limit to the size of the crop that can be 
harvested by the available labor force with Its given productivity. 
This limit is such that the entire labor force cannot be employed at 
nonharvest times its marginal product becomes zero at N*<l\l. 
The elimination of such a limit requires either an increase in the 
productivity of harvest-labor or an increase in the availability of 
capital per harvest-laborer, relative to nonharvest labor. We investigate 
the implications of such a change. 
Assume that the average productivity of harvest-labor has risen, 
either through technical change or increased capital or both, sufficiently 
to employ all of the labor force at nonharvest time. The expansion path 
along the 45° line in figure 2 implies employment of the entire labor force 
both at harvest and nonharvest time. We assume such an expansion path 
for modernised agriculture. 
It would be an unlikely coincidence if the marginal productivity 
of nonharvest labor along the 45° expansion path were zero for any N, rather 
than a positive amount. Figure 2, therefore, assumes a positive marginal 
product of nonharvest labor, as well as of harvest labor. The wage rate 
for nonharvest work is now positive. 
The increase in the average productivity of harvest labor implies 
that if the entire labor force is to be employed, the overall scale of the 
harvest must increase correspondingly. Agriculture as a whole, therefore, 
must be more prosperous than under the traditional conditions. Labor is 
also likely to be more prosperous since there is now a positive wage for 
nonharvest as well as for harvest work. Landlords may also be better off 
in the sense of getting higher rents per acre of land. The relative 
distribution of income between land and labor may change either way. 
With the nonharvest labor fully employed, the existence of 
seasonal unemployment or underemployment disappears from agriculture. 
The peculiar social and political conditions which necessitate making 
labor committed to work on a particular farm for the whole crop-year are 
no longer needed. They may disappear, being no longer in the interest of 
landlords or laborers, leaving free men working for monthly or weekly 
or dally contracts rather than for annual ones. In short, feudalism 
disappears.^ 
32. This is too optimistic. The institutional inertia in a feudal 
society may lead to a long lag between the disappearance of its economic 
base and the actual elimination of feudal practices. This lag will be even 
longer where economic feudalism was supported by the political conditions for 
feudalism . 
V.1.2 It would indeed be surprising if pure technical change, without 
any change in the capital per laborer, could take the economy to the 45° 
expansion path and maintain it there. Technical change does not seem to be 
that endogenous; otherwise the traditional agricultural production functions 
need never have existed for as long as they did. The increasing availability 
of capital per laborer must then be an important element in the change. 
The ratio of the capital per harvest-laborer to the capital per nonharvest 
laborer can be one possible endogenous variable maintaining the economy at 
the 45° expansion path. It is further likely that the increased relative 
productivity of harvest-labor comes through a relative increase in the 
capital per harvest-laborer, relative, that is, to the capital per non-
harvest worker. 
Conversely, the existence of traditional agriculture over 
centuries and in many societies, both poor and rich, is evidence that the 
mere availability of capital and Induced technological change is not adequate 
33 
for the disappearance of such agriculture. Exogenous technological 
change, as in the knowledge of construction of harvest equipment, is also 
essential. It did not occur to a sufficient degree until the eighteenth century 
in Europe. However, once the basic knowledge, essentially of an industrial 
nature in the manufacture and use of equipment, becomes available, the 
relative shortage of labor at harvest-time and its relatively high wage rate 
imply that the earliest agricultural machines would be designed to be 
useful mainly in harvesting, though they may also be used for other work 
through the year. That is, induced technical change replaces'— or saves 
more On-- harvest labor than It replaces nonharvest labor. Modernized 
agriculture emerges under such conditions. 
33. In China from the fourteenth to the middle of the twentieth 
century, population had risen seven to nine times. Per capita grain consumption, 
on a secular basis, either remained constant or may have even risen slightly. 
About half of the rise in grain output was due to migration to hitherto 
uncultivated land; the land area cultivated quadrupled over the period. There 
was increasingly adoption of double-cropping but there was little capital 
deepening; the number of implements and draft animals appear to have kept pace 
with the population. (26, pp. 185-89.) There were very few institutional 
changes over the period and agriculture did not change its production function 
sufficiently to eliminate seasonal unemployment. 
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These arguments can be illustrated in the context of the 
production function presented in (7). They key to the full employment 
of the labor force is either to raise the marginal productivity of 
harvest labor, keeping capital constant, or to use capital. If both of 
these occur, a simple functional form of the production function which can 
be used for illustration is 
Y = F[ G(N', L)3 H(vN", K") ] (15) 
where v (v>l) represents the increased efficiency of harvest-labor and 
K" is the amount of harvest-capital, that Is, capital equipment used only 
at harvest time. The marginal product of nonharvest labor may or may not 
increase in terms of the field-crop but would have to increase in terms 
of the harvested crop in the context of our earlier discussion in Section I. 
(15) highlights the fact that an increase in the supply of land 
through the opening up of virgin lands, or an increase in its efficiency 
through the use of capital, as with better ploughs, irrigation, fertilisers, 
etc - - termed as "landesque* capital by Sen [30] - - does not lead to the 
elimination of the seasonal unemployment of labor. These changes could, 
in fact, intensify such unemployment. 
Another way in which agriculture could switch from a traditional 
pattern of labor productivity over the crop-year to a modern one is by 
switching from farming to horticulture or cattle-raising. However, the 
demand for the products of' such agricultural activities is generally limited 
and absorbs only a small part of the agricultural labor force. Such a 
switch did occur extensively in transitional economies such as those in 
nineteenth century Europe and especially on family farms which could not 
meet the capital or technological requirements required by modernised 
farming. 
An interesting case emerges in the case of dual economies in 
which there is free mobility of labor between the two sectors, agricultural 
and industrial, and the industrial sector is sufficiently large relative 
to the agricultural sector„ The industrial sector has the peculiarity 
relative to the agricultural sector that the productivity of labor is 
not generally affected by seasonal factors and is, therefore, generally 
identical for each month, or week, of the year. Labor can, therefore, be 
paid the same wage rate for every month or week and yet retain its mobility 
through weekly or monthly employment contracts. This pattern cannot in 
general come about independently in agriculture since the productivity of 
labor varies over the crop-year. But if the industrial sector is relatively 
large ,the industrial wage-pattern will be imposed on agriculture so that 
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the marginal productivity of labor would have to conform to such a pattern. 
That is, the wage rate and the wage pattern with an unchanging monthly 
wage for every month of the year is exogenously given to the agricultural 
sector and labor productivity must conform to the exogenous wage and 
the exogenous wage pattern. Such conformity may be partly achieved through 
induced technical change and partly through a changing labor-capital ratio 
over the crop-year. The latter implies that more capital is used per 
laborer at certain times than others: the capital intensity is likely to 
be the highest at harvest-time. 
Assuming the same basic level of technology for harvest and 
non-harvest technology, the production function relevant to modernised 
agriculture would generally possess the form, 
Y = F(K«, K", N', N", L) (16) 
where K* is nonharvest capital and K" is harvest capital. The dominant 
industrial sector specifies the same monthly wage rate irrespective of 
the season so that the marginal productivity of N' and N" must be identical. 
Further, the condition for full year-round employment of labor in agriculture 
specifies that N®=N"„ The preceding production function can then be rewritten 
as, 
Y = F(K®, K", N, L) (17) 
with N*=N"=N and with N defined as the agricultural labor force. The 
dominant industrial sector is also similarly likely to specify the same 
unchanging cost and marginal productivity of capital over the year in 
agriculture. It is unlikely that this condition is met by the same 
capital-labor ratio in harvest as in nonharvest time so that it is likely 
that K® will differ from K". It is further likely that K"/N is higher than 
K'/N. 
Modern agriculture, therefore, differs from traditional 
agriculture in that differing amounts of capital, rather than of labor, 
are utilised over the crop-year. However, the unemployment of any given 
capital equipment for part of the year does not raise the type of serious 
social and political implications that traditional agriculture faced for 
labor: no social or political inalienable rights adhere to capital per se 
and are violated by its ownership. As far as labor Is concerned, its 
constant marginal product over the year, through a varying capital-labor 
ratio, allows for short-term contracts and labor mobility: the economic, 
base for feudalist control over human beings disappears. This is, in our 
context, the major social and political implication of the pattern of 
production and productivity over the year of industry and of the dominance 
of industry over agriculture. 
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V.2 A few comments on the transitional stage between the dominant 
traditional agricultural economy and the dominant industrial economy seem 
to be in order. The former was dominated by the fact that the marginal 
productivity of labor varied over the year. As the Industrial sector 
grows it tends to absorb labor from the agricultural sector. In this 
transitional stage, the annual wage rate in industry is somewhat higher 
than the annual wage rate in agriculture to induce the gradual transfer • 
of labor to industry. However, the time-pattern of the marginal productivity 
of labor In agriculture throughout the year has not fully adjusted and 
remains higher in the harvest season than at other times. Labor's 
productivity and wages in agriculture are, therefore, lower than those in 
industry in the nonharvest seasons so that the migration of labor to 
industry mainly occurs in such seasons. However, agricultural productivity 
and wages are likely to be higher in the harvest season as compared with 
those in industry, so that some reverse-migration to agriculture occurs 
34 
in this season. The stability of the work-force In industry is thus 
threatened at harvest-times and the firms in industry may resort to annual 
contracts or measures to tie down the labor to the firm at harvest times. 
These may take the form of extra bonuses, some part of the pay withheld 
through the year and payable at the end of the year, etc., or a mild form 
of feudalistic practices. Such responses are similar to those of traditional 
agriculture, though they are likely to be much milder since the problem 
of labor shortage to industry in harvest times Is relatively minor 
and relatively short in duration, e.g., a month or two at most each year. 
34. This may occur even in advanced industrial economies for 
certain crops In certain areas. Certain forms of fruit harvesting pose 
difficulties in mechanization and may adhere to the traditional pattern 
long after other forms of agriculture have adapted out of it. See(4, 
p. 144) and (3, p. 37). 
- 29 
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY. 
Georgescu-Roegen in the Richard T. Ely lecture in 1969, 
considered the fundamental nature of the production processes and argued 
that 
in any elementary process every agent Is Idle over 
some definite periods that depend not on our choice of whim 
but on the state of the arts... we can nonetheless eliminate 
this kind of idleness completely and ... there is only one 
way to achieve this: to arrange the elementary processes in 
a factory system... 
to operate an arrangement of elemetary processes 
in line it is absolutely necessary that we have the freedom 
to start a process at any time of the day, of the week, 
and of the year. Unfortunately, we do not always have this 
freedom. Seasonal variations— which result from the position 
of our planet relative to our main source of free energy, the 
sun— prevent us from adapting the factory system to a series 
of important productive activities. The most important Instance 
is husbandry. For the overwhelming majority of localities, 
there is a very short and definite period of the year during 
which a corn plant, for instance, can be grown in the open space 
from seed. This is why farmers have to work their fields in 
parallel; that is, in a system of production that yi£lds practically 
no economy of time... 
The association between agriculture and the idleness 
of all agents involved is by now a commonplace. Still, 
not much Is known or even suspected about the importance of 
the related loss, (ll, p.8) 
This paper has set out a simplified model of agriculture— or 
husbandry in Georgescu-Roegen's terminology— which is consistent with his 
ideas of the production processes. It showed the waste or loss involved 
in traditional agriculture as one of labor and derived the implications 
of that loss for the economic, social and political system, Modernized 
35 
agriculture, of a nonfactory kind, has also its wastage, though mainly 
in terms of idle capital rather than, of labor. But capital has no moral 
or ethical rights to any kind of freedom and its slavery poses no socio-
political problems. 
Crop agriculture is a single production process from the 
preparation of the land for the planting of the seeds to harvesting. This 
paper has suggested the hypothesis that this agricultural process has a 
35. Agriculture of a factory kind eliminates the loss due to the idle-
ness of some input or other. Such agriculture is to be increasingly found in 
meat-production, such as in chicken-farming, and, to a limited extent, in 
the hydroponic growing of crops such as tomatoes. 
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production function characterized, in traditional agriculture by the full 
employment of the labor force only in the harvest season. The limitation 
of the labor force in the harvest season limits the crop that can be 
harvested and, therefore, limits the crop that it will be optimal to plant. 
However, in general, the crop that can be actually grown on the land can 
be increased beyond such a limit by employing a higher proportion of the 
labor force in the nonharvest season. 
The underemployment of the labor force has serious implications 
not only for the wage rate but also for labor's social and political 
freedom. Maximisation of rent in an economy in which both land and 
labor are scarce implies strong pressures to bind labor to the farm 
through the crop year. Such restrictions often take the political and 
social form of a subject peasantry or vassalage. Variations in the 
intensity of such economic interest batween societies and times would 
cause variations in the degree of vassalage from serfdom to a relatively 
free yeomanry. A land surplus economy may even go so far as to practice 
slavery in farming in order to create a surplus for the propertied classes. 
Modern agriculture differs from traditional agriculture in 
employing its labor force fully, or almost fully, throughout the year. 
This requires an increase in the relative productivity of harvest labor 
compared with that of nonharvest labor. We have argued that such a change 
requires both technological change and an increase in the ratio of capital 
to labor in harvesting. The end result is to ensure a greater prosperity 
for agricultural labor while transferring the problems of the seasonal 
variation in employment from labor to capital. Capital, however, is 
by nature always a slave good. Its varying usage over the years does 
not lead to any interesting social and political practices that can 
characterise a society, as traditional agriculture did for labor through 
feudalism or slave-farming. 
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